The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.
N/A
Threat Mapped score: 0.0
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: Unclassified
CVE: CVE-2002-1771
CRLF injection enables spam proxy (add mail headers) using email address or name.
CVE: CVE-2002-1783
CRLF injection in API function arguments modify headers for outgoing requests.
CVE: CVE-2004-1513
Spoofed entries in web server log file via carriage returns
CVE: CVE-2006-4624
Chain: inject fake log entries with fake timestamps using CRLF injection
CVE: CVE-2005-1951
Chain: Application accepts CRLF in an object ID, allowing HTTP response splitting.
CVE: CVE-2004-1687
Chain: HTTP response splitting via CRLF in parameter related to URL.
N/A
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
Intro: The following code segment reads the name of the author of a weblog entry, author, from an HTTP request and sets it in a cookie header of an HTTP response.
Body: Assuming a string consisting of standard alpha-numeric characters, such as "Jane Smith", is submitted in the request the HTTP response including this cookie might take the following form:
String author = request.getParameter(AUTHOR_PARAM); ... Cookie cookie = new Cookie("author", author); cookie.setMaxAge(cookieExpiration); response.addCookie(cookie);Intro: If user input data that eventually makes it to a log message isn't checked for CRLF characters, it may be possible for an attacker to forge entries in a log file.
logger.info("User's street address: " + request.getParameter("streetAddress"));