DNS resolver uses predictable IDs, allowing a local user to spoof DNS query results.
Related Attack Patterns (CAPEC)
N/A
Attack TTPs
N/A
Modes of Introduction
Phase
Note
Architecture and Design
N/A
Implementation
N/A
Common Consequences
Impact: Varies by Context — Notes:
Potential Mitigations
N/A: Increase the entropy used to seed a PRNG. (N/A)
Architecture and Design: Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems. Consult FIPS 140-2 Annex C ("Approved Random Number Generators"). (N/A)
Implementation: Use a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself using input from high-quality sources, such as hardware devices with high entropy. However, do not re-seed too frequently, or else the entropy source might block. (N/A)
Applicable Platforms
None (Not Language-Specific, Undetermined)
Demonstrative Examples
N/A
Notes
Maintenance: As of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and
predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other
communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within
cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a
measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within
standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of
CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary,
distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for
different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for
mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.