The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.
Depending on the capabilities of the query language, an attacker could inject additional logic into the query to: Modify the intended selection criteria, thus changing which data entities (e.g., records) are returned, modified, or otherwise manipulated Append additional commands to the query Return more entities than intended Return fewer entities than intended Cause entities to be sorted in an unexpected way The ability to execute additional commands or change which entities are returned has obvious risks. But when the product logic depends on the order or number of entities, this can also lead to vulnerabilities. For example, if the query expects to return only one entity that specifies an administrative user, but an attacker can change which entities are returned, this could cause the logic to return information for a regular user and incorrectly assume that the user has administrative privileges. While this weakness is most commonly associated with SQL injection, there are many other query languages that are also subject to injection attacks, including HTSQL, LDAP, DQL, XQuery, Xpath, and "NoSQL" languages.
Threat Mapped score: 0.0
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: Unclassified
CVE: CVE-2024-50672
NoSQL injection in product for building eLearning courses allows password resets using a query processed by the Mongoose find function
CVE: CVE-2021-20736
NoSQL injection in team collaboration product
CVE: CVE-2020-35666
NoSQL injection in a PaaS platform using a MongoDB operator
CVE: CVE-2014-2503
Injection using Documentum Query Language (DQL)
CVE: CVE-2014-2508
Injection using Documentum Query Language (DQL)
N/A
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
Intro: The following code dynamically constructs and executes a SQL query that searches for items matching a specified name. The query restricts the items displayed to those where owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
Body: The query that this code intends to execute follows:
... string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName(); string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" + userName + "' AND itemname = '" + ItemName.Text + "'"; sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn); DataTable dt = new DataTable(); sda.Fill(dt); ...Intro: The code below constructs an LDAP query using user input address data:
Body: Because the code fails to neutralize the address string used to construct the query, an attacker can supply an address that includes additional LDAP queries.
context = new InitialDirContext(env); String searchFilter = "StreetAddress=" + address; NamingEnumeration answer = context.search(searchBase, searchFilter, searchCtls);Intro: Consider the following simple XML document that stores authentication information and a snippet of Java code that uses XPath query to retrieve authentication information:
Body: The Java code used to retrieve the home directory based on the provided credentials is:
<users> <user> <login>john</login> <password>abracadabra</password> <home_dir>/home/john</home_dir> </user> <user> <login>cbc</login> <password>1mgr8</password> <home_dir>/home/cbc</home_dir> </user> </users>