CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

Description

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

Extended Description

There are two main variations: Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks the input credentials against a hard-coded set of credentials. In this variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. It can also be difficult for the administrator to detect. Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains hard-coded credentials for connecting to that component. This variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product.

ThreatScore

Threat Mapped score: 3.0

Industry: Finiancial

Threat priority: P2 - Serious (High)

Observed Examples (CVEs)

CVE: CVE-2022-29953

Condition Monitor firmware has a maintenance interface with hard-coded credentials
CVE: CVE-2022-29960

Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation
CVE: CVE-2022-29964

Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access
CVE: CVE-2022-30997

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has a maintenance service that uses undocumented, hard-coded credentials
CVE: CVE-2022-30314

Firmware for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) has hard-coded credentials for access to boot configuration
CVE: CVE-2022-30271

Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used in typical deployments
CVE: CVE-2021-37555

Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]
CVE: CVE-2021-35033

Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
CVE: CVE-2012-3503

Installation script has a hard-coded secret token value, allowing attackers to bypass authentication
CVE: CVE-2010-2772

SCADA system uses a hard-coded password to protect back-end database containing authorization information, exploited by Stuxnet worm
CVE: CVE-2010-2073

FTP server library uses hard-coded usernames and passwords for three default accounts
CVE: CVE-2010-1573

Chain: Router firmware uses hard-coded username and password for access to debug functionality, which can be used to execute arbitrary code
CVE: CVE-2008-2369

Server uses hard-coded authentication key
CVE: CVE-2008-0961

Backup product uses hard-coded username and password, allowing attackers to bypass authentication via the RPC interface
CVE: CVE-2008-1160

Security appliance uses hard-coded password allowing attackers to gain root access
CVE: CVE-2006-7142

Drive encryption product stores hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypted configuration files in executable programs
CVE: CVE-2005-3716

VoIP product uses hard-coded public credentials that cannot be changed, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information
CVE: CVE-2005-3803

VoIP product uses hard coded public and private SNMP community strings that cannot be changed, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
CVE: CVE-2005-0496

Backup product contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a back door, which allows remote attackers to access the file system

Related Attack Patterns (CAPEC)

Attack TTPs

T1078.001 — Default Accounts (defense-evasion, persistence, privilege-escalation, initial-access)
T1552.001 — Credentials In Files (credential-access)

Malware

APTs (Intrusion Sets)

Modes of Introduction

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design	REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Common Consequences

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism — Notes:
Impact: Read Application Data, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Other — Notes:

Potential Mitigations

Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection. (N/A)
Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key. (N/A)
Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection. (N/A)
Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method. (N/A)
Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks. (N/A)

Applicable Platforms

None (Not Language-Specific, Undetermined)

Demonstrative Examples

Intro: The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a database:

Body: This is an example of an external hard-coded password on the client-side of a connection. This code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password. Once the program has shipped, there is no going back from the database user "scott" with a password of "tiger" unless the program is patched. A devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system. Even worse, if attackers have access to the bytecode for application, they can use the javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for the example above:

... DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger"); ...

Intro: The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password in the back-end:

Body: Every instance of this program can be placed into diagnostic mode with the same password. Even worse is the fact that if this program is distributed as a binary-only distribution, it is very difficult to change that password or disable this "functionality."

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) { if (strcmp(password, "Mew!")) { printf("Incorrect Password!\n"); return(0) } printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n"); return(1); }

Intro: The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a hard-coded cryptographic key.

Body: The cryptographic key is within a hard-coded string value that is compared to the password. It is likely that an attacker will be able to read the key and compromise the system.

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) { if (strcmp(password,"68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) { printf("Incorrect Password!\n"); return(0); } printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n"); return(1); }

Intro: The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.

Body: This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file ... webapp.ldap.username=secretUsername webapp.ldap.password=secretPassword ...

Intro: In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Body: Multiple vendors used hard-coded credentials in their OT products.

Notes

Maintenance: The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.

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