When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.
By entering a less secure state, the product inherits the weaknesses associated with that state, making it easier to compromise. At the least, it causes administrators to have a false sense of security. This weakness typically occurs as a result of wanting to "fail functional" to minimize administration and support costs, instead of "failing safe."
Threat Mapped score: 0.0
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: Unclassified
CVE: CVE-2007-5277
The failure of connection attempts in a web browser resets DNS pin restrictions. An attacker can then bypass the same origin policy by rebinding a domain name to a different IP address. This was an attempt to "fail functional."
CVE: CVE-2006-4407
Incorrect prioritization leads to the selection of a weaker cipher. Although it is not known whether this issue occurred in implementation or design, it is feasible that a poorly designed algorithm could be a factor.
N/A
N/A
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | N/A |
| Implementation | N/A |
Intro: Switches may revert their functionality to that of hubs when the table used to map ARP information to the switch interface overflows, such as when under a spoofing attack. This results in traffic being broadcast to an eavesdropper, instead of being sent only on the relevant switch interface. To mitigate this type of problem, the developer could limit the number of ARP entries that can be recorded for a given switch interface, while other interfaces may keep functioning normally. Configuration options can be provided on the appropriate actions to be taken in case of a detected failure, but safe defaults should be used.