The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product's control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.
If an attacker cannot directly contact a target, but the product has access to the target, then the attacker can send a request to the product and have it be forwarded to the target. The request would appear to be coming from the product's system, not the attacker's system. As a result, the attacker can bypass access controls (such as firewalls) or hide the source of malicious requests, since the requests would not be coming directly from the attacker. Since proxy functionality and message-forwarding often serve a legitimate purpose, this issue only becomes a vulnerability when: The product runs with different privileges or on a different system, or otherwise has different levels of access than the upstream component; The attacker is prevented from making the request directly to the target; and The attacker can create a request that the proxy does not explicitly intend to be forwarded on the behalf of the requester. Such a request might point to an unexpected hostname, port number, hardware IP, or service. Or, the request might be sent to an allowed service, but the request could contain disallowed directives, commands, or resources.
Threat Mapped score: 1.8
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: P4 - Informational (Low)
CVE: CVE-1999-0017
FTP bounce attack. The design of the protocol allows an attacker to modify the PORT command to cause the FTP server to connect to other machines besides the attacker's.
CVE: CVE-1999-0168
RPC portmapper could redirect service requests from an attacker to another entity, which thinks the requests came from the portmapper.
CVE: CVE-2005-0315
FTP server does not ensure that the IP address in a PORT command is the same as the FTP user's session, allowing port scanning by proxy.
CVE: CVE-2002-1484
Web server allows attackers to request a URL from another server, including other ports, which allows proxied scanning.
CVE: CVE-2004-2061
CGI script accepts and retrieves incoming URLs.
CVE: CVE-2001-1484
Bounce attack allows access to TFTP from trusted side.
CVE: CVE-2010-1637
Web-based mail program allows internal network scanning using a modified POP3 port number.
CVE: CVE-2009-0037
URL-downloading library automatically follows redirects to file:// and scp:// URLs
Phase | Note |
---|---|
Architecture and Design | REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic. |
Intro: A SoC contains a microcontroller (running ring-3 (least trusted ring) code), a Memory Mapped Input Output (MMIO) mapped IP core (containing design-house secrets), and a Direct Memory Access (DMA) controller, among several other compute elements and peripherals. The SoC implements access control to protect the registers in the IP core (which registers store the design-house secrets) from malicious, ring-3 (least trusted ring) code executing on the microcontroller. The DMA controller, however, is not blocked off from accessing the IP core for functional reasons.
Body: The weakness here is that the intermediary or the proxy agent did not ensure the immutability of the identity of the microcontroller initiating the transaction.
The code in ring-3 (least trusted ring) of the
microcontroller attempts to directly read the protected
registers in IP core through MMIO transactions. However,
this attempt is blocked due to the implemented access
control. Now, the microcontroller configures the DMA core
to transfer data from the protected registers to a memory
region that it has access to. The DMA core, which is
acting as an intermediary in this transaction, does not
preserve the identity of the microcontroller and, instead,
initiates a new transaction with its own identity. Since
the DMA core has access, the transaction (and hence, the
attack) is successful.