The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts. It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected. Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought. For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.
Threat Mapped score: 3.0
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: P2 - Serious (High)
CVE: CVE-2022-30273
SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity
CVE: CVE-2022-30320
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.
CVE: CVE-2008-3775
Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry.
CVE: CVE-2007-4150
product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data
CVE: CVE-2007-5460
product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data
CVE: CVE-2005-4860
Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged.
CVE: CVE-2002-2058
Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'.
CVE: CVE-2008-3188
Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes.
CVE: CVE-2005-2946
Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates.
CVE: CVE-2007-6013
Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.
Phase | Note |
---|---|
Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
Implementation | With hardware, the Architecture or Design Phase might start with compliant cryptography, but it is replaced with a non-compliant crypto during the later Implementation phase due to implementation constraints (e.g., not enough entropy to make it function properly, or not enough silicon real estate available to implement). Or, in rare cases (especially for long projects that span over years), the Architecture specifications might start with cryptography that was originally compliant at the time the Architectural specs were written, but over the time it became non-compliant due to progress made in attacking the crypto. |
Intro: These code examples use the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Body: Once considered a strong algorithm, DES now regarded as insufficient for many applications. It has been replaced by Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
EVP_des_ecb();
Intro: Suppose a chip manufacturer decides to implement a hashing scheme for verifying integrity property of certain bitstream, and it chooses to implement a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme.
Body: However, SHA1 was theoretically broken in 2005 and practically broken in 2017 at a cost of $110K. This means an attacker with access to cloud-rented computing power will now be able to provide a malicious bitstream with the same hash value, thereby defeating the purpose for which the hash was used.
The manufacturer chooses a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme because it already has a working SHA1 Intellectual Property (IP) that the manufacturer had created and used earlier, so this reuse of IP saves design cost.
Intro: In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
Body: Multiple OT products used weak cryptography.