CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Description

The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.

Extended Description

N/A

ThreatScore

Threat Mapped score: 0.0

Industry: Finiancial

Threat priority: Unclassified

Observed Examples (CVEs)

CVE: CVE-2022-29519

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends sensitive information in plaintext, including passwords and session tokens.
CVE: CVE-2022-30312

Building Controller uses a protocol that transmits authentication credentials in plaintext.
CVE: CVE-2022-31204

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) sends password in plaintext.
CVE: CVE-2002-1949

Passwords transmitted in cleartext.
CVE: CVE-2008-4122

Chain: Use of HTTPS cookie without "secure" flag causes it to be transmitted across unencrypted HTTP.
CVE: CVE-2008-3289

Product sends password hash in cleartext in violation of intended policy.
CVE: CVE-2008-4390

Remote management feature sends sensitive information including passwords in cleartext.
CVE: CVE-2007-5626

Backup routine sends password in cleartext in email.
CVE: CVE-2004-1852

Product transmits Blowfish encryption key in cleartext.
CVE: CVE-2008-0374

Printer sends configuration information, including administrative password, in cleartext.
CVE: CVE-2007-4961

Chain: cleartext transmission of the MD5 hash of password enables attacks against a server that is susceptible to replay (CWE-294).
CVE: CVE-2007-4786

Product sends passwords in cleartext to a log server.
CVE: CVE-2005-3140

Product sends file with cleartext passwords in e-mail message intended for diagnostic purposes.

Related Attack Patterns (CAPEC)

Attack TTPs

T1040 — Network Sniffing (credential-access, discovery)
T1056.004 — Credential API Hooking (collection, credential-access)

Malware

APTs (Intrusion Sets)

Modes of Introduction

Phase	Note
Architecture and Design	OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Architecture and Design	For hardware, this may be introduced when design does not plan for an attacker having physical access while a legitimate user is remotely operating the device.
Operation	N/A
System Configuration	N/A

Common Consequences

Impact: Read Application Data, Modify Files or Directories — Notes: Anyone can read the information by gaining access to the channel being used for communication. Many communication channels can be "sniffed" (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data.
Impact: Read Application Data, Modify Files or Directories, Other — Notes: When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to "sniff" the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information.

Potential Mitigations

Architecture and Design: Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols. (N/A)
Implementation: When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page. (N/A)
Implementation: When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications. (N/A)
Testing: Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. (N/A)
Operation: Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols. (N/A)

Applicable Platforms

None (Not Language-Specific, Undetermined)

Demonstrative Examples

Intro: The following code attempts to establish a connection to a site to communicate sensitive information.

Body: Though a connection is successfully made, the connection is unencrypted and it is possible that all sensitive data sent to or received from the server will be read by unintended actors.

try { URL u = new URL("http://www.secret.example.org/"); HttpURLConnection hu = (HttpURLConnection) u.openConnection(); hu.setRequestMethod("PUT"); hu.connect(); OutputStream os = hu.getOutputStream(); hu.disconnect(); } catch (IOException e) { //... }

Intro: In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

Body: Multiple vendors used cleartext transmission of sensitive information in their OT products.

Intro: A TAP accessible register is read/written by a JTAG based tool, for internal use by authorized users. However, an adversary can connect a probing device and collect the values from the unencrypted channel connecting the JTAG interface to the authorized user, if no additional protections are employed.

Intro: The following Azure CLI command lists the properties of a particular storage account:

Body: The JSON result might be:

az storage account show -g {ResourceGroupName} -n {StorageAccountName}

Notes

Maintenance: The Taxonomy_Mappings to ISA/IEC 62443 were added in CWE 4.10, but they are still under review and might change in future CWE versions. These draft mappings were performed by members of the "Mapping CWE to 62443" subgroup of the CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT Special Interest Group (SIG), and their work is incomplete as of CWE 4.10. The mappings are included to facilitate discussion and review by the broader ICS/OT community, and they are likely to change in future CWE versions.
Other: Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product's threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries.

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