The product uses an IP address for authentication.
IP addresses can be easily spoofed. Attackers can forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.
Threat Mapped score: 1.8
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: P4 - Informational (Low)
CVE: CVE-2022-30319
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
N/A
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic. |
Intro: Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.
Body: The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); serv.sin_family = AF_INET; serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); servr.sin_port = htons(1008); bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv)); while (1) { memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG); clilen = sizeof(cli); if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) { n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen); } }