This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
N/A
Threat Mapped score: 0.0
Industry: Finiancial
Threat priority: Unclassified
CVE: CVE-2022-30319
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address.
CVE: CVE-2009-1048
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header.
Phase | Note |
---|---|
Implementation | N/A |
Intro: The following code authenticates users.
Body: The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism.
String sourceIP = request.getRemoteAddr(); if (sourceIP != null && sourceIP.equals(APPROVED_IP)) { authenticated = true; }
Intro: Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.
Body: The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); serv.sin_family = AF_INET; serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); servr.sin_port = htons(1008); bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv)); while (1) { memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG); clilen = sizeof(cli); if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) { n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen); } }
Intro: The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.
Body: IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr; char* tHost = "trustme.example.com"; myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string); hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) { trusted = true; } else { trusted = false; }